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The growing use of new forms of surveillance technology across the day-to-day lives of children and the spaces they inhabit 
brings with it potential changes to childhood experience.  These technologies may change the way children interact with others 
and the way they come to understand the world around them. This article investigates the nature of these changes by looking at 
the impact of new surveillance technologies on a child’s experience of trust.  It aims to show that an increased surveillance 





There are many types of surveillance technologies used to observe, monitor and control the lives of 
children and they are used for a variety of reasons.  Surveillance technologies are often used for security 
purposes, such as when CCTV cameras are installed in childcare institutions to deter or detect harm 
perpetrated against children.  In other cases the primary reason for installing surveillance technology may 
be to improve administrative efficiency, one example being the use of fingerprinting in school libraries to 
administer and monitor borrowing. There is no question that children require care, protection and 
guidance in order to thrive. Surveillance technologies are often applied to children and children’s spaces 
with these aims in mind.  However, the use of surveillance technologies also has the potential to bring 
about changes to the spaces children inhabit. They may for example change the way children conduct their 
day-to-day activities, build relationships with others and come to an understanding of who they are and the 
world they live in.  The question is, what is the exact nature of these changes, and is it possible to identify 
any situations where an increased surveillance presence might be to a child’s detriment, perhaps inhibiting 
rather than enhancing childhood experience?  There are many angles from which this question could be 
investigated.  Here I limit my assessment to one such angle - an analysis based on the notion of ‘trust’.  
 
When I refer to surveillance technologies in this paper, these are generally ‘information’ technologies that 
bring with them the capacity to record, store, collate, relay and replay data about a child.  My interest is in 
those that are becoming a more common part of childhood experience, including: webcams and CCTVs 
that are now found in homes, childcare centres and schools; tracking devices including GPS locators fitted 
in a range of children’s accessories such as clothing items, backpacks and mobile phones; biometric ID 
and fingerprinting systems for school roll-calls and borrowing library books; online ‘spyware’; drug 
testing kits for parents; and an expanding range of other devices and database tools that provide new ways 
to track, monitor and control children’s activities.  This is not an exhaustive list but rather aims to give a 
general idea of the types of technologies that fall within the scope of this discussion.  
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The increasing use of these types of technologies to monitor and track children reflects a global trend.  In 
the United Kingdom, the government recently launched a database known as ‘ContactPoint’ that will 
eventually hold key personal, health and school details of 11 million children (BBC News 2009).  The 
United States is experiencing a growth in use of CCTV cameras in school playgrounds and classrooms, 
with the majority of new schools now installing these devices (Dillon 2003).  A new initiative in India is 
considering the use of biometrics to monitor school attendance at a state-wide level (Sindh Today 2009), 
and under-skin RFID chip implants have been promoted in South American countries as a tool to combat 
child kidnapping (Masters and Michael 2007; Scheeres 2002). 
 
The expanding use of these technologies is in part revealed through the changing practices of the 
surveillance industry itself where products are now marketed direct to parents and schools, rather than the 
more traditional markets of law enforcement and security.  The fact that these technologies are now more 
readily available and affordable has allowed individuals and families to turn to the use of such devices, 
whether to secure homes against intruders or monitor other individuals (Katz 2006; Monahan 2006).  This 
encroachment in use of surveillance technologies from the public to the private sphere is a notable change 
in the surveillance landscape and one that arguably increases the likelihood that a child will find 
themselves under surveillance in the day-to-day spaces they inhabit.  Another emerging trend in the use of 
surveillance technologies on children is that they are no longer just about discipline and control, but are 
used or perceived as a form of ‘care’ as well.  We only need to look at the brand names of some of the 
technologies available to see this emerging trend: a ‘net nanny’ to keep track of a child’s online activity; 
the ‘remote peace’ internet video monitoring service for childcare centres and schools; and a ‘teddyfone’ 
with tracking capacity for toddlers.  This paper aims to explore the impact of the expanding use of these 
technologies on a child’s experience of trust, including how a child is trusted by others and in turn learns 
to trust. 
 
In her 2002 BBC Reith Lectures, Onora O’Neill addressed the apparent ‘crisis of trust’ within society.  
O’Neill observed that while the media continually raises new stories about the perceived 
untrustworthiness of certain individuals and professions, there is little actual evidence to suggest that 
people are more untrustworthy than in the past.  What is new is the increasing evidence of a culture of 
suspicion.  According to O’Neill, the problem lies in our response to this changing environment, where we 
seek to impose more stringent forms of control on those who are perceived to be untrustworthy, rather 
than look at the way we trust others and how we might make changes to (re)build trust in society (2002).  
While the focus of O’Neill’s lecture was on trust in public and private sector institutions, I suggest 
something similar is happening when we look at the way surveillance technologies are used on children, 
raising questions such as: Is the increased use of surveillance technologies on children in part a response 
to the fact that we do not trust children or that we do not trust others who are with/around them?  If so, is 
our response based on an informed assessment of the risks involved?  Further, is the use of technologies as 
a form of control, or even ‘care’, an appropriate response to addressing a lack of trust or minimising risk?  
What are the implications for children, if we use surveillance technologies in this way, rather than 
building trust via alternative means?   
 
Before turning to these issues, I firstly discuss the notion of trust itself: what is trust, and why is it 
important?  In particular, I recommend using an extended notion of trust when it comes to children, as this 
provides more insight into what may be at stake for children in an environment where trust is undervalued 
or absent. 
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Trusting another and being trusted 
When looking at the notion of ‘trust’, I first of all consider how a child trusts others based on an 
understanding of ‘trust’ as a need to rely on the good will of others, and in this case the way children rely 
on others such as parents, carers, friends and strangers in a variety of ways to care for and protect them.  I 
then extend this to look at ‘trust’ from the perspective of a child being trusted by others to be responsible, 
to take control and do things in ways that extends their skills and competencies.  It is this second 
dimension that is not as prominent in the literature on trust, and yet which reveals much of what is 
important for a child in ‘being trusted’.  Overall, I argue that, if we are to fully appreciate the formative 
role of trust in childhood experience, we need to consider both these aspects of the notion of trust.  This is 
because, taken together, they help to explain the key foundations of a child’s relationships with others and 
the importance of trust in a broader sense for a child’s development as a competent, confident and active 
human agent.   
 
In a key article on trust, Annette Baier (1986) develops an account of what it is ‘to trust’ others. The 
motivation for Baier is to address the moral question ‘whom should I trust in what way and why?’ (1986, 
232)  According to Baier, trust is a form of reliance on another’s good will.  That is, when I trust someone, 
I am depending on their good will toward me, and in doing so become vulnerable to the limits of that good 
will. This is in part because I leave the way open to being harmed by another, and have to trust that they 
will not do this (1986, 234-5). 
 
Why then do we trust others when this leaves us vulnerable?  There are many reasons.  One is that trusting 
others can be beneficial, even necessary.  Trust allows us to form and build relationships, to rely on the 
safety of the food we eat, to drive on the roads and use public transport, to seek advice from health 
professionals and to carry out many other basic day-to-day actions (McLeod, 2006). Further, we need to 
trust others, not just to meet these needs or to avoid harm, but in order to create and transform things in 
our day-to-day lives.  This is because many things we value – whether this relates to children, political 
life, the arts, reputation or friendship – require us place ourselves in a position where others may: 
 
injure what we care about, since those are the same positions that they must be in in order to help 
us take care of what we care about. (Baier 1986, 236)   
 
Another reason we trust others, even though this may leave us vulnerable, is that we often have little or no 
choice; we simply find ourselves in a position where we must trust another.  Trust is therefore inextricably 
tied with notions of choice, power and control.  When we are in a position to make a choice, trust 
inevitably involves giving the person being trusted some control, and in many cases discretionary power, 
over what is entrusted.   
 
One of the features of trusting others is that this does not always involve a conscious decision to trust 
another or not, or therefore an explicit decision to place oneself in a vulnerable position to another; this 
may happen without being aware of it (Baier 1986, 244).  Trust also often involves people in dependent or 
unequal power relations with each other, and Baier argues that we need to acknowledge these 
relationships of dependency if we are to move beyond a simplified, contract-based approach to how we 
understand trust (1986, 241).  This is particularly helpful in understanding a child’s trust-based 
relationships with others.   If we consider how an infant trusts a parent, the infant is initially powerless in 
such a relation.  The infant can however be said to ‘trust’ enough for example to accept food that is 
offered.  As the infant gains increasing power, they learn that the parent is not invulnerable and that they 
too in turn need to trust the child (Baier 1986, 242-3).  What develops therefore is a relationship of mutual 
trust, and even over time as the relationship tends to become more equal, it would not make sense to 
characterise the relationship as a contract-based one:    
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Not only has the child no concept of virtual contract when she trusts, but the parent’s duty to the 
child seems in no way dependent on the expectation that the child will make a later return. (Baier 
1986, 244)  
 
A child might not make a conscious decision to trust a parent when they are first born, but can develop a 
more conscious sense of trust over time. A child can also easily come to distrust a parent if the trust is 
destroyed, and while trust can be easily broken, distrust is much harder to mend. It is however from the 
most basic trust between a parent and child, that emerges a sense of trust that becomes amongst other 
things more conscious, controlled and discriminatory, allowing children to ‘trust [themselves] as trusters’ 
(Baier 1986, 244-5).   
 
In summary, when someone is trusted, this generally refers to them being relied upon for some benefit or 
non-harm to the person doing the trusting.  While initially children may have little choice but to trust 
others, from very early on they do have this choice with respect to some activities, and this soon expands, 
and includes the choice to distrust or to withhold trust.  Just as children need to trust adults, there are 
instances when an adult or another child will need to trust a child.  That is, they will rely on the child to 
behave in a certain way or perform a certain task in order not to harm, or in order to meet some interest of, 
the person doing the trusting.  These situations might range from simple interactions such as keeping a 
friend’s secret, to even quite onerous circumstances such as where a young child might at times need to 
feed, protect and care for a parent who is not well.   
 
One of the other benefits of trusting children is that it can be shown that ‘trust leads to trustworthiness’ 
(Lahno 2001, 183; Pettit 1995, 218).  This happens because, when others trust us, we become trustworthy 
beings.  Further, it is through the act of trusting others that we learn to trust and we come to know the 
value of trust.  Some have described this as a self-perpetuating feature of trust, and it applies equally to 
distrust as well.  If we distrust someone: 
 
we tend, except in extremely clear cases, to interpret his or her actions and statements in a 
negative way; even intended overtures may be rejected as attempts to manipulate or deceive. 
(Govier 1992, 18) 
 
Having opportunities to trust and to be trusted are therefore a crucial part of a child’s learning how to be 
with others in a way that supports their capacity to live and to live in a meaningful way.  This is not to say 
that trusting others or being trusted is always a good thing.  There may be situations where trust is 
unwelcome or misplaced, or where it imposes limitations on a person’s action that is unwanted or feels 
‘coercive’ (Jones 1996, 9).  There are also situations where distrust may be warranted and a necessary 
response to potential danger.  Children therefore not only need to learn to trust, but they need to learn to 
trust with good judgement, to trust well (O'Neill 2002).  Children also need to be seen as dialogical 
partners in negotiating trust and risk, not simply subjects of control, a theme that will be returned to later 
in this paper. 
 
The lessons of trusting and being trusted are important for children.  However, there is something else that 
is happening when we (as adults) ‘trust’ a child that is not fully addressed by the notion of trust discussed 
so far. These are the situations where an adult trusts a child to perform a certain action competently or 
responsibly, but where this does not involve relying on the child to do this in order to serve the interests of 
the adult.  Rather, the child is being trusted in order to further the interests of the child via a positive 
expression of confidence in a child’s ability to perform a particular action or task.  This is the notion of 
‘trust’ that is involved when a parent says to a child ‘I trust you to walk to your friend’s place on your 
own’ or ‘I trust you to climb that tree safely’.  That is, the adult expresses confidence in the child’s 
capacity to do something (even if this is for the first time) based on what they know of the child’s 
competency and risks involved, with the aim of allowing the child to extend their confidence and skills. Of 
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course, trusting a child to perform such tasks may at the same time indirectly serve the interests of another 
(such as the parent), but usually it is primarily in the interests of the child and the child’s development.  
This is similar to what Horsburgh refers to as ‘therapeutic trust’, where we trust someone as a form of 
moral support and expression of confidence in their capacity with the aim of increasing the trustworthiness 
of the person being trusted (1960, 348). 
 
I therefore suggest that, when we talk of ‘trust’, particularly when it relates to children, we also include a 
notion of trust that refers to a positive expression of confidence in a person where the benefit is more for 
the person being trusted than for the person doing the trusting.  For children, many actions are new and 
untested.  If they are trusted to extend themselves, this may help them to develop both competence and 
confidence.  In the context of educational settings, it has been observed that a teacher may give a student a 
task that requires responsibility even where they believe it is fairly risky to trust a particular child with that 
task.  In placing this trust, they signal confidence in that child, and in doing so ‘the teacher may count on 
the pupil being additionally motivated by the signal of trust to do what is right’ (Lahno 2001, 184). 
Teachers may therefore trust children in order to awaken these skills. That is, the teacher trusts a child 
with a responsible task in order to reveal to the child their own capacities and potential.  In this way the 
child does not just gain the confidence of others around them, but acquires a sense of self-confidence as 
well.  This is supported by Lahno’s argument that: 
 
This sort of trust is at the heart of any genuine educational enterprise.  It requires a positive 
sympathetic attitude toward the pupil as an evolving person (Lahno 2001, 184).   
 
What we can take from Lahno’s argument, is that it is sometimes appropriate to trust children, even when 
we are unsure if they have the skills to perform the task set, as it signals confidence in the child and may 
in turn build a child’s confidence in themselves.   
 
There are a range of reasons a person may welcome the opportunity to be trusted; for example, someone 
may wish to be trusted in order to receive the good opinion of the person who has trusted them (Pettit 
1995, 219).  This may be some of what a child is responding to when they take on the trust placed in them 
to (at least try to) perform a certain task.  That is, they aim to please their parents or carers who will then 
think well of them.  However, it is possible that, in part, a child simply wants to have control over 
particular actions and do things for themselves for the sheer pleasure of succeeding at something new, or 
perhaps to overcome the frustration of not being able to do things they see others do.  The desire to be 
trusted on this view stems from a sense of determination and growing self-confidence, in addition to any 
desire to please others.   
 
So, when we talk of ‘trusting’ children, it is helpful to consider an expanded notion of trust with two key 
dimensions: the notion of trust as relying on others for a certain benefit or non-harm to the person doing 
the trusting; and, trust as a positive expression of confidence in the child.  It is this second dimension that 
takes account of a child’s a desire to do or control something that is new or for them as yet unchartered 
territory – not simply to please those who care for them, but as a self-confident expression in their own 
creativity and subjectivity.  
 
I turn now to the relationship between trust and risk, as this helps to reveal some of the implications for a 
child if opportunities to trust others and to be trusted are denied through an over-reliance on surveillance 
technologies. 
 
Surveillance technologies – childhood experience of trust and risk 
It has been observed that ‘risk is generally held to be a central characteristic of a trustful interaction’ 
(Lahno 2001, 171), and, even more strongly, that ‘trust necessarily involves risk’ (McLeod 2006, 1).  This 
is because trusting others inevitably opens up a window of risk – that being what is at stake if the trust is 
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misplaced or disappointed.  Given that we must trust others if we are to get through many both mundane 
and meaningful day-to-day activities, it follows that there will be situations where it is either necessary or 
on balance a good thing to take some types of risks.  If we take the expanded view of trust just discussed, 
trusting children leads to risks on a number of fronts.  It raises the risk that others may not care for, or may 
harm, a child in a situation where the child is vulnerable to or reliant on another, and there is also a risk 
that the child themselves might not live up to the trust placed in them.  Just as we need to trust, we 
therefore need to take the risks that trusting entails; and this is not just to meet our basic needs, but also 
because ‘it seems impossible to live a satisfying life entirely without risks’ (Lahno 2001, 172).  
 
It is clear then that people do not aim to live a life that is entirely risk free, as this would render us 
immobile.  Indeed some would argue even more strongly that risks lie at the very basis of creativity, and 
that what is missing in all the attempts to assess, measure and control risks is: 
 
the acknowledgement of unpredictability and non-calculability (true risk, that is) as an inherent, 
disruptive and creative force of teaching and learning. (Papastephanou 2006, 50)  
 
Papastephanou argues that the tendency in education to apply a discourse of control is far removed from 
the reality of the lack of certainty we face in human life (2006, 48).  Further, what we see from learners is 
a ‘longing for the risks that make life meaningful’ (Papastephanou 2006, 49). 
 
It may seem obvious to make the point that life inevitably involves risks, but the ways in which 
surveillance technologies are used on children appear to aim at achieving a risk-free environment, with 
‘risk-avoidance’ promoted as a given good.  A couple of examples illustrate this point. Baby monitors can 
be used to detect temperature, humidity, breathing and heart rate in addition to transmitting sound and 
video images, aiming to promote peace of mind and reassurance for parents that their baby is safe while 
sleeping or resting. While such monitors may provide a helpful tool in particular situations, it is open to 
question whether promoting such devices as the ‘must have’ gadget for ‘responsible parents’ (Baby Video 
Monitors Review) is an appropriate response to the actual risk that all parents encounter. GPS tracking 
systems that are installed in children’s clothing, mobile phones or watches are also promoted as a general 
parental tool, aiming to provide reassurance to parents that they will always know where their child is. 
(See for example Track My Kids)  It is the growing promotion of these forms of surveillance as 
‘normalised’ responses to everyday risks that reveal how efforts to monitor and control children using 
such technologies promotes an approach to childhood that aims to leave little to chance.   
 
There is no doubt that questions of balancing trust and risk are complex.  Parents, carers and teachers need 
to consider on the one hand whether children are protected sufficiently from harm, and whether there are 
certain technologies that can help achieve this.  On the other, they may need to consider whether there are 
situations when it is appropriate to accept some risk rather than make use of surveillance technologies in a 
way that is over-reactive and out of proportion to the risks involved.   
 
Sometimes, the desire to protect children from harm may be motivated by an exaggerated fear of the risks 
involved or an under-estimation of a child’s competency to deal with a particular situation.  For example, 
in a study of parental concerns about children’s use of public space, Valentine argues that the global 
media coverage of violent crimes heightens parental awareness of these types of risks, and, even though 
the parents acknowledge the risk is very low, they nonetheless fear for their children and take steps to 
protect them and keep them from public spaces (2004, 15).  In public spaces, children are discouraged 
from interacting with strangers, and: 
 
Unable or unwilling to trust their children to manage their own safety in public places, most 
parents actively control and restrict their children’s use of space. (Valentine 2004, 55-6)    
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Valentine explores the types of negotiations about the spatial ranges that children are allowed to explore in 
public spaces without an adult present (2004, 56).  The study revealed that: 
 
While some parents actively try to develop their children’s autonomy and streetwise skills, for 
example, by giving them special ‘licences’ to make specific journeys, others are more cautious, 
keeping their offspring under covert surveillance. (Valentine 2004, 57)  
 
While the reaction from children may differ, evidence from Valentine’s research suggests that children 
often have capacity to make decisions about risk, and may at times resist and subvert the levels of control 
adults try to put in place. Valentine gives examples of children colluding with each other to tell stories that 
will reassure parents while giving them the freedom to go out and about, and of children hiding incidents 
from parents to save the parents from being anxious (2004, 63 & 65).   
 
Where there is a climate of fear about public spaces, it is possible to see how parental fears might lead to a 
tendency to use tighter mechanisms of control, including the range of surveillance technologies that are 
now more readily available to parents.  However, such an approach, particularly where it is an over-
reaction to the risks involved, makes it difficult for children to negotiate an appropriate, realistic and 
constructive balance between trust and risk.  One reason for this is that surveillance technologies are 
relatively inflexible, and tend to be applied in a constant, homogeneous manner, and as a result the 
opportunities for a child to negotiate terms of freedom or to subvert the controls that are placed on them 
rapidly diminish.  The technologies, when applied in this way, have no mechanisms to account for or 
adapt to each child’s capacity and surrounding context.  A CCTV installed in a school classroom does not 
operate differently depending on the context or needs of each individual child.  It is there as a ‘catch all’ 
measure for any person – whether student, teacher or visitor - under its gaze.   
 
Another reason that the use of surveillance technologies makes it difficult to negotiate a balance between 
trust and risk is that they take away some forms of communication that are critical to achieving this.  The 
chance for a child to negotiate or find some space where they can be trusted is limited by the often distant 
and non-interactive way in which surveillance devices such as CCTV cameras are used.  In some 
situations, limited negotiation may be possible; for example, some parents ‘trust’ a child to go out on their 
own or with friends on the condition that the child agrees to being monitored via a mobile phone or type 
of GPS tracking systems (Jones, Williams, and Fleuriot 2003, 175; Fotel and Thomsen 2004, 544).  
However, more often than not, because surveillance technologies are used to allow monitoring from a 
distance, they potentially reduce the opportunity for negotiation.   
 
While it is possible to establish and build trust over a distance (as is evident across a range of online 
transactions), it has been noted that there are some features of trust that can only be conveyed in co-
present encounters.  In a co-present conversation, it is the timing, the pauses, and the fact that there is no 
set pattern to the discussion, which all contributes to establishing and underpinning the trust that is 
established in any such encounter: 
 
A certain form of trust can be displayed and appreciated between actors – a trust that derives from 
the observable timing and placement of talk and gesture. (Boden and Molotch 1994, 267)  
 
The subtleties of such encounters are lost if trust is replaced with a surveillance device, as there become 
fewer openings for dialogue, less chance to understand and respect the other as a person, and less 
opportunity for the child to establish a trust-based relationship with the observer.   
 
It has been observed that constant negotiation between children and adults is a key feature of childhood 
experience (Eckert 2004, 10). Wherever there is an opportunity to negotiate options for balancing trust and 
risk there is also the possibility for re-negotiation and greater extension of autonomy for the child as 
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his/her capacity develops and the adult’s confidence in the child’s capacity is reinforced.  To the extent 
that using surveillance technologies might remove such opportunities, there is a risk that a child’s 
experience and development of trust may be diminished. 
 
The complex layers of control, and the messages that accompany the promotion of surveillance 
technologies, make it difficult for parents and carers to keep sight of the fact that there are some situations 
when it may be all right and even necessary to expose children to some risk.  While protecting or caring 
for children using surveillance technologies may be well-intentioned, we need to question both whether 
this provides a realistic form of protection and also whether the technologies may in fact be depriving 
children of the opportunity to develop confidence and competence in skills that would in turn leave them 
in a stronger position to assess and manage risks across a range of life experiences. 
 
Surveillance technologies do not always provide a viable form of protection, either because the 
technologies do not work or because they are attempting to control things that in reality cannot be 
controlled in this way.  There is evidence to suggest that, while surveillance technologies, such as CCTV 
cameras,  have shown some effectiveness in allowing criminals to be tracked down after the event, they do 
not actually prevent or reduce crime in any significant way (Monahan 2006, 4).  Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that the focus on security in childhood may in fact distract from other dimensions of childhood 
experience that also require our urgent attention.   Katz notes that the rise in parental anxiety about 
children has resulted in strategies of ‘hyperviligence’ (as evidenced by the growing market in surveillance 
technologies) that can never really be up to the task of protecting children in the ways that are most 
needed.  In relative terms, the need to protect a child from a dangerous or neglectful nanny, or even a 
stranger, is not as pressing as other challenges such as poverty, inequality, homelessness and ‘under-
stimulating public environments’ (Katz 2006, 31-2).  If children are overprotected across a range of 
situations by an ever increasing array of micro-mechanisms of control, then the problem becomes not just 
that this may be an over-reaction to the potential risks involved, but that this may in turn add to the climate 
of suspicion and fear perhaps at a cost to other skills and experiences that a child needs if they are to face 
broader life challenges.  
 
If we consider the example of a child’s online activities, we can see the range of issues that might arise.  
On the one hand, children may need protection from the potential harms of online activity (such as 
bullying, harassment, criminal activity, identity fraud, exploitation for commercial gain and inappropriate 
content to name some concerns that emerge).  On the other hand they may also need to develop skills and 
acquire their own knowledge about how to make judgements about ‘others’ they meet online or 
information they come across that might be potentially harmful.  High level, secretive monitoring by 
parents of a child’s email or online activity is one approach to controlling children in this situation, but it 
ignores the role trust plays in developing a child’s capacity to eventually handle such situations on their 
own.  One benefit of trusting a child is that they can learn to deal with difficult situations in a way that 
develops further skills and competencies.  Also, a child who is not trusted, may in fact engage in more 
secretive (and perhaps more risky) behaviour.  The potential damage to the trust relationship between 
parent and child is far greater if the child is not aware they are under surveillance, as it is not just the act of 
surveillance itself, but the deception involved which destroys the basis of any trust relationship (O'Neill 
2002). 
 
The impact on the development of skills and competencies in childhood can also be seen if we consider 
the growing use of smartcards and online ordering systems to replace cash transactions in a school 
canteen.  While these new systems may aim to improve efficiency or to develop healthy eating habits, they 
also introduce a new level of control over how parents and the school monitor what a child eats and how 
they spend money (Rout 2007).  As these types of systems become more widespread, one question to 
explore is whether there are any consequences of denying a child the opportunity to be trusted to spend 
canteen money wisely without this type of monitoring.  If children are not at some point trusted with 
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handling money, then there is a risk they may fail to learn important skills or that the development of such 
skills may be delayed.  Of course, a child in whom such trust is placed may fail on some occasions to 
spend the money as they were asked to, choosing to spend it otherwise.  However, the benefits arising 
from the opportunity to be trusted (for example, in terms of skills or confidence generated), may be 
significant in comparison to any risk of a child failing to live up to the trust placed in them in this instance.  
This example highlights how opportunities for children to have some discretion and control in matters that 
are relatively ‘safe’ seem to disappear when new technologies with surveillance capacity are introduced, 
as they take away from children an opportunity to be trusted.   
 
These examples draw out some of the changes children face in their day-to-day experience of trust as 
surveillance technologies become an increasing feature of the spaces they move about in.  One additional 
complexity is that the messages about trust are not always clear; for example in determining who and in 
what regard it is thought a person(s) cannot be trusted.  The ambiguity of the surveillance gaze makes it 
unclear who in the population cannot be trusted, and it potentially extends to all, making it difficult for a 
child to know when to trust another or not.  When a school introduces CCTV cameras into the classroom, 
this may be for purposes of security for the teacher or students, yet the message about trust that 
accompanies this may not be so clear.  One of the ironies is that a surveillance presence can produce 
unease and fear for all under its gaze because it implies that there is a reason to mistrust or suspect those 
around you.  In this sense, the use of surveillance technologies can add to the culture of suspicion, rather 
than build a sense of security and trust.  It has also been noted that there is a degree of complicity in the 
role of both the media and the companies who make surveillance technologies in perpetuating this culture: 
 
The culture of fear generated by the media spills over into a culture of control in schools. ... 
Surveillance equipment is one material and symbolic manifestation of this reactionary culture of 
control. (Monahan 2006, 117)  
 
Such influences need to be acknowledged if we are to understand the range of pressures that bear on a 
child’s experience and understanding of trust. 
 
The examples mentioned here show that the use of surveillance technologies (whether intended or not) 
carry with them a judgement about trust, even if the exact target of this activity remains unclear or 
ambiguous to those under the gaze.  If we take this a step further, it is possible to view the use of 
surveillance technologies as a replacement for trust and trust based relationships.  That is, instead of 
relinquishing some control and trusting a child, or others with a child, or even trusting one’s own 
judgement in caring for the child, and accepting the risks this entails, an attempt is made to replace this 
‘need to trust’ with some sort of surveillance device.  Of course, such devices cannot obviate the need to 
trust entirely, but the intention appears to be to go some way to reducing the trust that may be required. 
 
None of this discussion is intended to say that we should not seek to avoid risks in some situations – of 
course we do this regularly throughout each day.  It is usually necessary for example to hold a two-year 
old child’s hand near a busy street, and if an older child is being bullied it is reasonable to discuss 
strategies with the child to deal with this to avoid escalating the potential for harm.  Rather, the key point 
is that it is unrealistic to avoid risks in all situations, and if one of the trends of the use of surveillance 
technologies is to watch, control and monitor children at all times ‘just in case’ of some perhaps unknown 
or remote risk, then the consequences of this may be significant.  Rather than simply ‘playing it safe’, 
parents and carers may be depriving children of the opportunity to be trusted and to learn about trusting 
others, and the opportunity for growing competence and capacity that can result from this.  The greater 
risk may therefore lie in using surveillance technologies as a risk avoidance strategy, rather than adopting 
a more realistic and flexible approach to balancing trust and risk.  As noted earlier, part of what it is to 
trust is to relinquish some control: ‘we do not have the power to control other people’s actions completely, 
we must necessarily trust’ (Lahno 2001, 172).  Perhaps acknowledging this contingency is a key part of 
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forming a more realistic assessment of the limits of what surveillance technologies might achieve in 
reducing risks to children. 
 
Beyond surveillance to building trust 
The fact that the increasing use of surveillance technologies has the potential to change a child’s 
experience of trust is significant.  Children, generally speaking, have less choice when it comes to the 
need to trust others, and are at a key stage in developing an understanding of others and society more 
broadly in a way that sets the foundation for their own sense of self.  As discussed earlier, the lack of 
opportunity for trust-based activity has the potential to undermine a child’s developing sense of self-
confidence and may even fail to provide the conditions for this development to occur in the first place.  A 
child’s capacity to become competent and responsible is therefore threatened if the role of trust in a child’s 
emerging agency is overlooked rather than nourished.   
 
This raises an important ethical dimension to a child’s experience of being trusted and trusting others, and 
from being exposed to risks that trust-based encounters with others give rise to.  It has been noted that 
there is a certain ‘moral blindness’ at play when risks from unknown others are exaggerated, often 
perpetuating cultural preconceptions that have no basis in fact  (Papastephanou 2006, 58).  Unless a child 
is able to place themselves in a position of trusting the ‘other’, and exposing themselves to whatever risk 
this may entail, then they also have little basis for understanding the ‘other’.  This type of risk is a 
‘necessary condition for an ethical relation to the other, it makes the welcoming of the other possible’ 
(Safstrom quoted in Papastephanou 2006, 58).  Without such trust-based encounters, there is also no basis 
for making decisions about which risks may be worth taking and which are to be avoided.  It is only by 
building trust, that we can in turn understand and make better judgements about trusting.    
 
One of the limitations of surveillance technologies when they are used to monitor the spaces children 
move about in, is that children are given the message that there are ‘others’ who cannot be trusted.  Yet, as 
a basis for ethical decision making, this presents a view of others that is often highly arbitrary and all 
encompassing, providing no basis on which a child can come to an understanding of others as beings who 
are also vulnerable and reliant on trusting relationships in the same way.  There is also no basis for a child 
to develop as a ‘truster’; that is, to learn how to make well-placed decisions about who to trust in the 
future.  Whether it is intended or not, the ways in which surveillance technologies are increasingly being 
used to monitor and control children’s lives conveys, and perhaps even betrays, an underlying lack of trust 
both in the children themselves and in all those others who share the spaces around them.  Furthermore, 
these acts of surveillance fail to bring with them any ways in which the child may build the necessary 
trust-based relationships that are needed for the child to become both trusting and trusted. 
 
This leads to the question, if we only trust a child or others with the child because surveillance 
technologies are being used, then in what sense can we be said to be genuinely trusting them?  It has been 
argued, that the only way we can trust others is if their actions or behaviour reinforces the trust we have 
placed in them, and those others have taken responsibility for meeting that trust (Bailey 2002, 6).  If a 
child acts in a certain way (for example, decides not to go into the swimming pool area because an alarm 
will be triggered from the CCTV if they do so), in what sense are they genuinely fulfilling the trust placed 
in them if this only arises from the fear of detection and punishment rather than because they understand 
the responsibility they have been entrusted with?  Raising such questions may help determine the extent to 
which a child’s experience of trust may be weakened with a surveillance presence.  
 
None of this is to say that trust cannot have a place in any decisions around the use of surveillance 
technologies.  Perhaps, if surveillance is applied in a well-judged manner based on the risks posed to 
children in a certain circumstance, and done with the knowledge and involvement of the children under 
surveillance, then it may be possible for trust to retain a place in a child’s encounters with others.  
Similarly, if such technologies can be used to maximise potential benefits, and at the same time respect the 
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child as an active agent in any such situations, then some of the potential problems may be overcome.  
This however would require a conscious acknowledgement of the value of trusting children, and working 
to ensure they do not become a victim of over-reactive and over-controlling applications of surveillance. 
One possible approach would be to monitor children at a population or group level (such as when 
monitoring the content of children’s online usage in a school environment) to determine whether there are 
any significant risks posed to the children, and discuss the potential risks and consequences with them, 
before considering whether and when it may be appropriate to monitor activity at the individual level.  In 
this way surveillance is used as a tool only when a significant risk has been identified, all other avenues of 
learning and negotiation have been followed through and where there is evidence that the use of 
surveillance might lead to a reduced risk for the child.  
 
Conclusion 
In practice, the problem that surveillance technologies pose for trust, is not just in how and when the 
surveillance is used, but in the very fact that it has been introduced at all.  Without a surveillance gaze, 
children have the opportunity to be trusted, to learn how to trust others, and perhaps to show others they 
can live up to this trust.  Once the surveillance is in place, this opportunity is greatly reduced.  Pettit makes 
the point that intrusive, heavy regulation can remove opportunities for trust by leaving little room for the 
opportunity to demonstrate that one can act responsibly in the absence of such rules (1995, 225).  It is 
possible to see here how over-surveillance might do the same.  That is, to the extent that surveillance 
technologies take away the opportunity for a person to show they can be trusted without the need for 
surveillance, then building trust cannot even get started.  
  
As CCTV cameras are introduced into more classrooms and fingerprinting becomes more commonplace 
for roll-calls and borrowing library books, as parents are marketed drug-testing kits they can use on their 
children and two year olds have cameras embedded in teddy bears to watch over them, it is important to 
question whether these are the methods we (as adults) ought to be using to care for, protect or even 
discipline our children.  If surveillance is applied as a response to fear, rather than a more balanced 
response to any actual risks involved, then arguably both adults and children become reactive agents 
contributing to a cycle of suspicion and anxiety, robbing childhood of valuable opportunities to trust and 
to be trusted.   
 
It is only through understanding the value of trust, and coming to an acceptance of the necessity of some 
risk, that we can begin look for alternative ways to guide a child’s development that can provide the 
foundations for an active and creative sense of selfhood, rather than stifle such opportunities. 
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